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CABLE, CONTENT REGULATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT*
Henry Geller**
and
Donna Lampert * **
Cable television's growth in the last five years has been explosive. Pene-
tration has increased from under 20% to 35% of television households and
is predicted to be 50%-60% by the end of the decade.' Pay services are the
engine largely responsible for driving cable's growth in the major mar-
kets.2 Advertising revenues have risen to approximately $283 million with
predictions of $4.6 billion by 1990. 3 Available programming has gone far
beyond the simple retransmission of broadcast television. Cable with its
"narrowcasting" approach, now has channels with, for example, all sports,
Spanish-language, news, and children's programming. 4 Numerous text
services have been tested and many are now in the developmental stage.5
Interactive cable and addressable converters are in the offing and cable is
even being thought of as an alternative to the telephone company in some
significant respects.6 Not all the proposed or existing cable services will
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the position of the Washington Center for Public Policy Research.
•* Director, Washington Center for Public Policy Research. J.D. 1949, Northwestern
University Law School.
•** Associate, Washington Center for Public Policy Research. A.B. 1978, Bard College;
J.D. 1982, University of California, Los Angeles Law School.
1. Nielsen Charts Cable Universe at 35% Penetration, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at
92 (Nielsen November 1982 market-by-market figures); Cable: Coming to Terms with Adult-
hood & A Fifth Estate Glossary, BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 74-75.
2. Fifteen pay cable services are currently available. THE HOME VIDEO AND CABLE
NETWORK YEARBOOK 1982-83.
3. Paul Kagan Assoc., Long Range Projections, CABLE TELEVISION ADVERTISING,
April 3, 1983, at 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. Cox Cable, Inc., for instance, is currently engaged in a test of its INDAX cable text
service in San Diego, Cal. and is marketing the service commercially in Omaha, Neb. For a
complete listing of text services, see INTERNATIONAL VIDEOTEXT NEWS, No. 36, Dec. 1982.
6. Interactive, or two-way cable, allows audience members to provide feedback on
programs or other services. Addressable converters will allow viewers to request specific
programming (e.g., pay per view services). As part of the franchising process, cable compa-
nies in the large markets pledge to construct institutional networks that pass many busi-
nesses. These networks thus can serve the needs of banks for data communications or an
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succeed. As shown by the demise of CBS Cable and the Entertainment
Channel,7 there will surely be a "shake-out," with inevitable winners and
losers. Nonetheless, cable is an increasingly potent communications
medium.
This growth of cable makes it all the more important to resolve the first
amendment strains and puzzles that have arisen. Each different medium
poses new and unique first amendment issues,8 and cable is no exception.
This article addresses the general problem of content regulation of cable
television, with particular focus on the first amendment issues.9
The initial and most important constitutional question can be stated
simply: Can Congress or the FCC regulate the program content of cable
television consistently with the first amendment-as is now done with
broadcasting-or are controls requiring fairness constitutionally prohib-
ited as in the realm of print media? To answer the basic question, current
cable content controls are analyzed, as are the regulatory models which
now apply to broadcast and print media. The telephone (common carrier
model) is also briefly discussed. Cable is then compared with the other
media to determine whether there are sufficient similarities to justify adop-
tion of their regulatory models. The article concludes that while cable is a
hybrid, broadcast-type regulation such as fairness requirements cannot
constitutionally be applied to its nonbroadcast operations (i.e., activities
that do not involve carriage of broadcast signals). In any event, such con-
SBS or MCI for local distribution to the businesses. See, e.g., MCI Explores Use of Cable
TV, Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1982, at CI; Columbus Sets June I Launch for Institutional Net-
work, Multichannel News, Jan. 24, 1983, at 27.
7. On Sept. 13, 1982, CBS announced the end of its advertiser-based cultural service
because of a break with Disney, large financial losses (over $40 million) and no prospects on
the horizon. Sifting Through the Fallout of CBS Cable, BROADCASTING, Sept. 20, 1982, at
27. The Entertainment Channel owned jointly by RCA Cable, Inc., and Rockefeller Center
Cable, Inc. folded effective Mar. 31, 1983. Arts Cable Channel, 9 Months in Service, To Cease
Operations, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1982, at 1, col. 8.
8. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). See also cases cited infra
note 52. In the cable area, see, e.g., Goldberg, Ross, & Spector, Cable Television, Government
Regulation, andthe First Amendment, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 577 (Summer 1981); Miller & Beals,
Regulating Cable Television, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 607 (Summer 1981).
9. Several constitutional issues have arisen in the cable television field. Questions of
municipal ownership and the constitutionality of waiver of first amendment rights to gain a
franchise should be discussed. The requirement of free public access channels raises due
process issues. In fact, the Constitution is invoked almost routinely for every imaginable
claim. See, e.g., Avenue TV Cable Serv. v. City of San Buenaventura, 82-5274-ER (BX)
(C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1982); Century Cable v. City of San Buenaventura, 82-5274-ER
(BX) (C.D. Cal., filed Oct. 12, 1982); Catalina Cablevision Assoc. v. City of Tucson, Civ. No.
82-459 TUCAC (D. Ariz. 1982, filed July 1982); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. City
of Denver, 82-1738 (D. Colo., filed Oct. 18, 1982). These problems, and their substantial
constitutional dilemmas, are beyond the scope of this article.
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trols should not be applied as a matter of sound policy. Common carrier
requirements (leased channel access), on the other hand, can be constitu-
tionally imposed, and should be, in order to attain first amendment goals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Current Content Regulation
FCC content regulations distinguish between programming that is car-
ried on a cable system subject to the "exclusive control" of the cable opera-
tor--"origination cablecasting"'°-and programming which the cable
operator does not control." On origination channels, Commission regula-
tions require that equal opportunities be afforded legally qualified candi-
dates in the use of the stations' facilities,' 2 that the cable system afford
reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on contro-
versial issues of public importance (the fairness doctrine)' 3 and that the
cable operator notify a person or group who was personally attacked in a
discussion of a controversial issue and offer reasonable time to respond.' 4
In addition, origination channels cannot carry lottery information-except
state run lotteries"5 -or advertising which lacks sponsorship identifica-
tion.' 6 The Commission also bars the transmission of obscene or indecent
material on cable origination channels.'
10. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w) (1982).
11. "Exclusive control" is not defined by the Commission.
12. 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (1981).
13. Id. § 76.209 (1981). Although it is often assumed to apply in full, no guidance has
been given by the FCC as to the application to cable of both parts of the fairness doctrine, as
stated in 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1981) and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
377 (1969) (i.e., (1) to adequately cover issues of public importance, and (2) to do so fairly,
so as to reflect opposing views). This first part of the doctrine is poorly enforced by the
Commission in the broadcast area. See Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV, 11
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 629 (1974). There are clearly large unaddressed questions concerning
cable and content rules.
14. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1982).
15. Id. § 76.213.
16. Id § 76.221.
17. Id. § 76.213. The attempts of some states and localities to proscribe "indecent" ma-
terial on cable have been struck down as overbroad. See, e.g., HBO v. Wilkinson, 531 F.
Supp. 986 (C.D. Utah 1982). The same court recently struck down a Roy, Utah, municipal
ordinance which barred distribution by cable of any "indecent material" on the grounds that
the statute failed to meet Miller standards, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and was
overbroad, and that cable was different than broadcasting. The city has appealed. US.
Judge Says Utah City Ordinance Censoring Cable is Unconstitutional, BROADCASTING, Jan.
17, 1983, at 86. But see Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 125,
127-28 (8th Cir. 1982). Significantly, the constitutional propriety of such narrowly drawn
regulations emanating from the Commission has not been passed upon as it has been in the
broadcast context. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) concerning indecency in broad-
1983]
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The FCC adopted equal opportunities and fairness requirements in
1970 under its general authority in the cable area.' 8 The regulations now
appear to have statutory backing. In 1972,.when Congress ordered that
broadcasters make available to candidates the lowest unit advertising rate,
it also amended section 315 of the Communications Act to provide that for
the purposes of the section "the term 'broadcasting station' includes a com-
munity antenna television system."' 9 Since section 315 specifies equal op-
portunities and fairness in subsection (a),20 the statutory change made
these broadcast concepts applicable to cable. There is no explanation or
reference to this in the legislative history.
There is also a substantial issue whether the reasonable access provision
of section 312(a)(7)2" of the Communications Act applies to cable. When
Congress amended the Communications Act to require that broadcasting
stations give candidates for federal elective office reasonable access to their
stations,2 2 it also stipulated that the term "broadcasting station" has the
same meaning as in section 315 of the Communications Act. 23 This cross-
reference would appear to make the reasonable access provision, which
was a part of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act, applicable to cable,
and the Commission so stated in its 1972 primer.24 However, the Commis-
sion has never enforced the access requirement against cable operators and
now appears to question whether it can do so.25
casting. See Obscene or Indecent Matter on Access Channels, 59 F.C.C.2d 984 (1976);
Cable TV Access Channels, 83 F.C.C.2d 147, 148 n.l (1980).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
19. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). The provision was originally designated
§ 315(0, but was recodified without change, as § 315(c).
20. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380.
21. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
22. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), adding 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). See CBS, Inc. v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
23. Now § 315(c); see supra note 19. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), § 102.
24. Use of Broadcast and Cablecast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 34
F.C.C.2d 510, 510 n.2, 37 Fed. Reg. 5796, 5805 (1972) ("The amended §§ 312 & 315 apply to
both broadcast stations and cable television systems .... ").
25. See FCC Report to Sen. Goldwater, Cable Television and the Political Broadcasting
Laws, Jan. 1981, at 24-26 (FCC Report). While the Commission could not revoke the li-
cense of a cable television system, it could enforce the provision by adopting rules, by cease
and desist actions under § 312(b), or forfeiture under § 503(b), 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(b), 503(b)
(1976 & Supp. VI 1981).
The above report is also interesting in its indication of increasing fairness or equal time
problems for cable systems. The problems are now infrequent because of cable's small pen-
etration in comparison with television. But they do arise, with, for example, Cable News
Network, FCC Report at 31-33, or other news/public affairs cable operations, and will un-
doubtedly increase, as cable's importance does, id at 1-2.
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This tendency to lump cable with broadcasting is further illustrated by
the ban on cigarette advertising. That ban apparently applies to cable as
well as to broadcasting since cable is a "medium of electronic communica-
tion." 6 Again there is no consideration or discussion of this facet in the
legislative history.
Not all broadcast regulations apply to cable, however. There are no as-
certainment requirements for cable as there are for broadcast television;
nor are there percentage guidelines for local or nonentertainment pro-
gramming. 7 Federal access requirements for cable were discontinued in
1979.28
B. The Development of Cable Regulation
A brief discussion of FCC jurisdiction over and regulation of cable is
instructive. Although cable has evolved from a "community antenna tele-
vision system" into a versatile broadband communications delivery mech-
anism, the rules by which cable has been governed have not kept up.
In 1968, the Supreme Court first upheld the Commission's authority to
regulate cable, then called CATV or community antenna television.2 9 The
Court found that CATV systems constituted "communication by wire or
radio" within 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(a), (b), and were "interstate" within the
meaning of the Communications Act.30 The Court's jurisdictional holding
was no broader than necessary and was limited to the regulations then
before it, all involving the carriage of broadcast signals. Instead of spelling
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). The law states: "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful
to advertise cigarettes and little cigars on any medium of electronic communication subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission."
27. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.4020 (1981) (ascertainment); 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1981)
(guidelines).
28. In 1972 the FCC prescribed access regulations which required cable operators,
among other things, to devote a number of channels to public, governmental, educational,
and leased access. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972); Report
and Order in Docket No. 20528, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976); 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252-76.258 (1976).
These regulations sought to promote the first amendment goal of diversity through the
"multiplicity of viewpoints" which should occur if all are given access. United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.), aft'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
See generally Lange, The Role ofAccess Doctrine in Regulation of the Mass Media. A Critical
Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1973); Note, The Future of Content Regulation in
Broadcasting, 69 CtA~F. L. REv. 55, 556 n.15 (1981); Report, 59 F.C.C.2d at 296. In 1979,
however, the Supreme Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video H), 440 U.S.
689 (1979), held that the access rules impermissibly imposed common carrier obligations on
cable operators. See infra text accompanying note 42. Since then, there have been no feder-
ally imposed access requirements for cable systems.
29. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
30. Id at 168; Communications Act of 1934, § 3(e), 47 U.S.C. 153(e) (1976).
1983]
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out the limits of the Commission's authority, the Court stated: "It is
enough to emphasize that the authority which we recognize today under §
152(a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary-to the effective performance
of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting. 3 1 Thus was born the "reasonably ancillary" test which has
ruled cable ever since.
In 1969, in its First Report and Order in Docket No. 18,397,32 the Com-
mission first applied the fairness doctrine and equal opportunities provi-
sions of section 315(a) to cable as "necessary in the public interest for
origination conducted in conjunction with carriage of broadcast signals." 33
The Commission stated that the provisions of section 315 and the congres-
sional policy expressed therein, would be thwarted unless the rules were
applied to cable. 34 The FCC noted that "plac[ing] broadcast signals in a
setting of inequality, unfairness, and hidden sponsorship . . . would de-
stroy the signals' integrity and defeat the purposes of the obligations im-
posed on broadcasters in the public interest." Under this rationale, cable
systems that do not carry broadcasting signals incur no fairness or equal
time obligations.
When the FCC addressed the first amendment implications of the fair-
ness rules, it emphasized that there is no right to provide broadcasting sig-
nals to the public in a manner which is contrary to the public interest.36
Further, it said that the regulations promote the first amendment interests
31. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178.
32. 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 220 (1969) [hereinafter cited as First Report and Order].
33. First Report and Order, supra note 32, at 219. Enforcement of the rules was simple:
Unless the rules were complied with, no system was to carry broadcast signals. The Com-
mission could assert jurisdiction over cable on several other bases, in light of the broad
definitions in the Act. Id at 219-21. It has never sought to do so, however, and thus the
"reasonably ancillary" criterion has continued to govern.
34. Id at 220.
35. Id (citation omitted). The Commission's actions belied its rationale, however. In
its 1972 report, 36 F.C.C.2d at 196-97 (par. 145), the Commission eliminated fairness doc-
trine requirements for the access channels (public, governmental, or leased). This meant
that cable viewers would receive TV channels, some subject to fairness obligations (i.e., the
TV stations and cable channels over which the system exercises "exclusive control"-
whatever that may mean) and some not (the access channels). The Commission's 1972 ac-
tion was sound, since the purpose of fairness is to afford the opportunity to provide conffict-
ing views, which by definition the access channel does. But the Commission failed to
recognize that the access channel fulfills that function for the entire system. Stated differ-
ently, the Commission did not recognize the difference between broadcasting, with its single
channel, and cable, with its multiple channels, including access ones. Significantly, a peti-
tion is pending before the Commission filed by the National Telecommunications and Infor-
mation Administration to make fairness inapplicable to any system with public access
channels (RM 3526, filed May 13, 1980).
36. Midwest Television, Inc., 15 F.C.C.2d 84, 91 (1968).
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articulated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC37 : "It is the purpose of
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee."'38 The Commission concluded that the content regulations are
not barred by the first amendment because they are related to the public
interest, even though there is no scarcity of frequencies with cable.39
Two significant Supreme Court cases address the nature and extent of
the Commission's ability to regulate cable content, and to a lesser degree,
the first amendment problems which arise. These cases are United States v.
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I),' and FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.
(Midwest Video 1I).41
In Midwest Video I, the Court upheld FCC regulations requiring large
cable systems to originate programming. The rules were deemed reason-
ably ancillary to broadcasting, since they contributed to the Act's goal of
effective local outlets. As noted, this origination programming is subject to
fairness and equal opportunities regulations as long as the cablecaster has
"exclusive control." In Midwest Video I, however, the Court held that
Commission regulations requiring cable operators to provide access chan-
nels for government, public, educational or leased use were beyond the
Commission's "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction since such common car-
rier-type regulations could not be imposed on broadcasters under section
3(h).42 Thus, the Court still perceived cable as a medium which is regu-
lated only in relation to broadcast television; that it has become "en-
meshed in the field of television broadcasting" and is the "functional
equivalent of broadcasting. '43 The Court declined to decide first amend-
ment questions raised by the regulations, except to say that the issue was
"not frivolous.''"44
37. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
38. Id at 390 (citations omitted).
39. First Report and Order, supra note 32 at 222 n.27.
40. 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
41. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
42. Id at 702. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
43. 440 U.S. at 700. See also Brookhaven Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765, 767
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979) ("mhe FCC may regulate cable TV if its
regulation will further a goal which it is entitled to pursue in the broadcast area.").
44. 440 U.S. at 709 n. 19. It should be noted, however, that the Eighth Circuit did touch
upon the first amendment argument to a greater extent. That court stated in dictum: "If the
Commission has any authority to intrude upon the First Amendment rights of cable opera-
tors, that authority. . . is less, not greater than its authority to intrude upon the first amend-
ment rights of broadcasters." Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056 (8th Cir.
1978), af'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
19831
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One case that considered the first amendment issue is Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC,45 where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit invalidated FCC rules restricting cable's access to pay
programming. The court found that "an essential precondition" of the Red
Lion approach-"physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring
role for government"-is inapplicable to cable, with its abundance of
channels and wire method.' While the court recognized that cable may be
"a natural economic monopoly," it stated that "scarcity which is the result
solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even lim-
ited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the conven-
tional press. . . ,and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a
constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this
point."47 The court then considered whether the regulations were valid
under the O'Brien test4 -whether the regulations further an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
speech, and the incidental restriction of alleged first amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest. It found
the particular regulations invalid because, although not designed to sup-
press free speech, they were overbroad and, on the record before it, did not
serve the necessary governmental interest.49
II. THE REGULATORY MODELS
In part due to increasing criticism of the content regulations from the
cable industry,50 and in part due to the rapidly evolving new technologies
which raise the issues once again (e.g., teletext/videotext), there is cur-
rently much debate about what type of content regulations can constitu-
tionally be applied to various electronic media.5 While the range of
45. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). The issue of
cable and the first amendment was also treated in the context of a preliminary injunction in
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
dismissed, 102 S. Ct. 2287 (1982).
46. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 45.
47. Id at 46 (citations omitted).
48. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
49. Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 48.
50. See Report to Senator Packwood, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and
the First Amendment, NCTA (April 1981).
51. There is considerable controversy even in the broadcast field, where it must be as-
sumed that the fairness doctrine and its progeny are constitutional when applied to conven-
tional broadcasting. See, e.g., Sulzberger Urges Solidarity on First Amendment and Paley
Renews Callfor First Amendment Equality with Print, BROADCASTING, Nov. 22, 1982, at 29-
30, 49. There is extensive literature on the subject. See, e.g., Barrow, The Equal Opportui-
ties and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Should They be Retained?, 1 CoMM/Ewr L.J. 65
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preferred solutions tracks the various industry interests, the relevant regu-
latory models must be carefully considered and the nature of the cable
medium compared to that of other regulated media. The first amendment
requires such an analysis rather than the simplistic generalizations and
analogies that have been made to date. We must return to square one.
As noted, differences in the characteristics of media justify different first
amendment standards and what passes first amendment muster can vary
depending upon the content of the expression (i.e., commercial speech, ob-
scenity, "fighting words"). 2 Three basic models for regulating media are
relevant:" broadcast, print and common carrier.
None of these regulatory models is completely appropriate for cable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Midwest
Video II noted: "Neither the basic rationale for regulation of common
carriers (to ensure fair and equal access to the carrier's service) nor that for
regulation of broadcast transmissions (to preclude bedlam on broadcast
frequencies), is applicable to cable systems per se."" Nor is the print
model of regulation automatically applicable to cable.55 Nevertheless, it is
most helpful to examine those regulatory models as a starting point, since
often "[1law . . . is determined by a choice between competing
analogies." '56
A. Broadcast
No other medium exists that could be constitutionally regulated to the
(1977); Note, The Future of Content Regulation in Broadcasting, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 555
(1981); Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics". An Analysis of the First Amendment
Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 1 (1978); Bazelon, FCC Regulation
of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213; Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and
Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation ofthe Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1977); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and
Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1967). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1978). There is even a proposal by Sen. Packwood for a constitutional
amendment making the first amendment fully applicable to broadcasting. Packwood Hears
Supportfor Liberation of Modern Media, BROADCASTING, Oct. 4, 1982, at 29.
52. See, e.g., RedLion, 395 U.S. at 386; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 501 (1981). Each medium of expression must thus be assessed for first amendment
purposes by standards suited to it. Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,
557 (1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
53. This list does not cover all media of expression. Different standards apply, for ex-
ample, to billboards, movies, and soundtracks. See generally supra note 52 and accompany-
ing text.
54. 571 F.2d 1025, 1036 (8th Cir. 1978), af'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
55. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1376.
56. Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW AND ECON.
15, 38 (1967).
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same degree and in the same way as the broadcast medium. Broadcasters
are licensed for short terms, and must periodically satisfy the government
that their overall operations serve the public interest.57 The Communica-
tions Act requires local and informational programming and the FCC en-
forces these requirements through the ordinary and comparative renewal
process. 58 Broadcasters are subject to content regulations such as the fair-
ness doctrine and equal time requirements.59 Indecency is not permitted.60
Reasonable access for federal candidates for elective office is required.6'
Network affiliates in the top fifty markets must eschew network or off-
network programming from seven p.m. to eight p.m., with specified excep-
tions for children's programming or documentaries (public affairs).6 2 In
short, the broadcaster's freedom is substantially restricted as compared
with all other media.
Courts have upheld all of the above requirements as being consistent
with the first amendment. Two basic rationales are used to explain the
constitutionality of such policies. First, the Supreme Court has upheld the
public trustee regulations because of the scarcity inherent in the broadcast
medium.63 Second, indecency regulations have been upheld because of
the unique impact of broadcasting.' 4
1. Scarcity Theory
Congress established the Federal Radio Commission in 1927 to allocate
radio frequencies because not all who wished to speak could do so due to
the great number of voices and the scarcity of channels.65 Scarcity de-
scribes the condition where demand exceeds supply. "[S]carcity may exist
despite the existence of many channels just as there may be no scarcity
though there were but one channel-which no one had the slightest inter-
est in exploiting." s No scarcity would exist, however, if the party who
57. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
58. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(b), 307(d), 315(a) (1976).
59. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377 (upholding the fairness
doctrine).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976).
62. National Ass'n of Indep. Television Prod. & Distrib. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526 (2d Cir.
1975); see also Goldberg & Couzens, supra note 51, at 19-23.
63. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 388-89.
64. Pacfca, 438 U.S. at 748.
65. During debates prior to enactment of the Radio Act of 1927, Congressman White,
its sponsor, stated that the legislation was necessary because in the "present state of scientific
development there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting stations. 67
CONG. REc. 5479 (quoted in RedLion, 395 U.S. at 376 n.5.
66. Freedom of Expression and the Electronic Med." Hearings Before the Senate Corn-
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could not get a channel could acquire a channel in the same or an adjacent
area without cost or interference to the existing channels. This situation
exists with newspapers. With broadcasting, however, there is no automatic
ability to provide additional channels.67
Congress chose to give exclusive, short term licenses on the condition
that the licensee act in the public interest.68 The Court noted in Red Lion,
however, that Congress could have chosen other bases for its licensing
scheme, such as the common carrier or partial access models.69 The Court
stressed in Red Lion:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given
the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the
entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to
matters of great public concern. To condition the granting or re-
newal of licenses on a willingness to present representative com-
munity views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends
and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the
abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.70
Based on this view of the first amendment, the Court in Red Lion upheld
the constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine, which requires broad-
casters to devote a reasonable amount of time to the airing of controversial
issues, and to be "fair" in their efforts.7 ' The Court found "no sanctuary
in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a
medium not open to all.",72 The goal of the first amendment, according to
the Red Lion Court, is to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoli-
mittee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1982) (mimeo)
(statement of William Van Alstyne) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Scarcity still exists de-
spite 10,000 broadcast stations. There are no AM, FM or VHF channels open in the top 100
markets, and if one did become available in the larger markets, there would be a dozen
applicants. See infra note 77.
67. Hearings, supra note 66, at 22.
68. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1163; Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301,
307(a) (1976).
69. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390-91; see also Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 44; Kalven,
supra note 56, at 30-32.
70. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394.
71. Id at 389.
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a
proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves.
72. Id at 392.
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zation of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee."73 In an oft-quoted passage, the Court added: "It is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount."74 The Court considered the claim that the FCC regulations
would have a chilling effect on broadcasters, but found that the possibility
was "at best speculative."" It decided that the Commission could take
remedial steps to require broadcaster treatment of controversial issues76
and that the Court could revisit the issue if and when such effects might be
definitively shown.
The Red Lion Court based its opinion on the physical scarcity of fre-
quencies which then existed and still persists in all large markets.77 This
scarcity must be distinguished from economic scarcity, a term often used in
attempts to justify regulations which affect first amendment rights. Eco-
nomic scarcity is sometimes referred to as "scarcity of investment capital"
as opposed to physical scarcity which is "scarcity of frequencies on which
to communicate., 7 1 While physical scarcity and the need for government
licensing can support a regulatory structure which restricts editorial auton-
omy, economic scarcity must be tolerated because the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of expression is based on laissezfaire.79 Therefore,
the fact that not everyone can speak through a given medium, because
each individual cannot afford to do so, will not justify government inter-
vention in the speech area.80
73. Id at 390.
74. Id
75. Id at 393.
76. The Court stated that "if present licensees should suddenly prove timorous (because
of fairness obligations], the Commission is not powerless to insist that they give adequate
and fair attention to public issues." Id But the Court is here relying on more content
regulation to cure a problem of content regulation--a dubious proposition. Further, a gov-
ernment agency cannot really set an agenda for robust, wide-open debate; the licensee neces-
sarily chooses the issues and the manner of treatment. How then, would the FCC deal with
licensees that choose to cover school vandalism rather than some "hot" local issue that
might raise difficult fairness problems?
77. See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Much of this
persisting scarcity stems from faulty allocation schemes adopted by the FCC. See Hearings,
supra note 66, at I (statement of Sen. Jackson). This criticism has considerable validity as a
matter of policy. But as a legal matter, the courts must deal with the practical situation
before them, and that is one of scarcity. More people want to broadcast than there are chan-
nels available. The judiciary cannot wave a magic allocation wand and change the present
engineering limitations.
78. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 223.
79. See Emerson, Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 823
(1981).
80. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974); Home Box
Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 46.
[Vol. 32:603
Cable, Content Regulation
2 Unique Impact Theory
The second basis for some unique regulation of broadcasting is the im-
pact theory. Regulation of broadcasting is justified because of that me-
dium's special impact upon the American public."' A subset of this theory
is the "captive audience" concept-that broadcasting is pervasive and
therefore regulation is necessary to prevent an unwarranted intrusion.
In FCC v. Pacofca Foundation,82 the Court upheld the Commission's
power to regulate "indecent" speech on broadcasting--to bar the use of
"seven dirty words." Such speech is clearly protected by the first amend-
ment in other contexts. The plurality relied on two factors, both of which
are facets of the impact theory: broadcasting is pervasive and it is
uniquely accessible to children. Justice Stevens' opinion found that broad-
casting intrudes upon the privacy of the home and is therefore inescapable,
so that the Commission's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, prohibiting
the indecent-as well as the obscene-from being broadcast, is
constitutional.83
The impact theory can be attacked in several ways. First, it is difficult to
argue that broadcasting today has a greater impact than did newspapers in
1789 when the first amendment was adopted. It was precisely because
newspapers had such great impact that freedom of the press and of speech
were so important then.14 Further, it is absurd to argue that The New York
Times does not have far greater impact than its radio station, WQXR-FM,
81. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 51, at 222. Judge Bazelon believes that the scarcity
rationale can only be justified in terms of the impact of broadcasting. The only reason
scarcity is a problem, he argues, is because it produces less diversity, necessitating regulation
to produce diversity. He argues that those who claim there is a dearth of diversity do so
because they are looking only at broadcasting rather than at all media, electronic or not.
This focus, says Judge Bazelon, demonstrates that the real concern is the potency of broad-
casting communications. Id at 228. See also Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC,
473 F.2d 16, 73-74 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
82. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Pac#/ca involved the use of "seven dirty words" in a serious
discussion program that clearly had no prurient appeal. The FCC construed the applicable
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464, to give a meaning to "indecent" separate from "obscene"-
namely, that if material was patently offensive, it met the test of indecency. There was no
need to consider the other two elements of the obscenity test set out in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
83. Pacftca, 438 U.S. at 738, 747-51. But see dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan. Id
at 762 (radio is a public medium).
84. Judge Bazelon has stated that the real fear is the power of the telecommunciations
press obtained by oligopoly in the production of news and entertainment programming
rather than power inherent in the medium itself. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 222. But when
Justice Stevens speaks of the pervasiveness of the broadcast media in Pac#ca, he is talking
about the power inherent in the medium, whether it is controlled by one entity, several, or a
large number of entities. 438 U.S. at 748.
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one of forty-five stations in the New York area. Second, it is wrong to talk
about broadcasting viewers or listeners as a "captive audience" in the same
way bus riders are when messages are transmitted on a bus.85 Just as those
who do not want to see the slogan "Fuck the Draft" are free to avert their
eyes,16 those who listen to radio or watch television can always twist the
dial or turn off their sets.87 Finally, as to accessibility of broadcast
messages to children, it is wise to bear in mind an earlier Supreme Court
admonition that we cannot reduce adults to the level of children in order
to protect children.88
The impact theory is most deficient as a justification for content regula-
tion of broadcasting. Significantly, it is not cited by the Supreme Court as
a basis for fairness. It appears rather to be confined to the area of indecent
programming, and to reflect a determination by a majority of the Court to
"protect" the broadcast audience, whatever the consitutional costs. It is
significant, however, because of its possible application to cablecasts of
"offensive" material.89
B. Print Model
Unlike broadcasting, the printed press enjoys the greatest first amend-
ment protection of all media. A privately owned newspaper may "advance
its own political, social, and economic views ...bounded by only two
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers-and hence
advertisers-to ensure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integ-
rity of its editors and publishers."'  In the lead case, Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornilo,9 the Court held that a Florida right of reply statute
was an unconstitutional infringement of the first amendment. The Court
85. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
86. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
87. HBO v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 986 (C.D. Utah 1982). See Pacofca, 438 U.S. at
766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
89. See infra note 127; but see Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694
F.2d 119, 128 (7th Cir. 1982) ("This consideration [PacqfcaJ is independent of whether the
television signal comes into the home over the air or through a coaxial cable.").
90. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,255 (1974) (quoting Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)). Of
course, newspaper publishers are subject to nondiscriminatory application of the general
laws despite the indirect effect they may have on the publishers' ability to disseminate infor-
mation. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1377 n.7. See also Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-31 (1937)
(labor relations laws); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); but see Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 51 U.S.L.W. 4315 (Mar. 29,
1983) (tax on newsprint and ink held an unconstitutional burden on newspapers).
91. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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found that enforcement of a right of reply imposes additional costs on the
newspaper (i.e., either expanding the size or omitting content), and that
this might deter treatment of issues which could trigger the reply.92 But
even more significantly, the Court stated that the right of reply statute in-
truded into the editorial function of newspapers and, as such, violated the
first amendment.93
How does one square Red Lion and Tornillo? Both cases involve similar
right of reply regulations. In Red Lion, the regulation promotes the first
amendment values of balanced, vigorous debate, and any "chilling" costs
are deemed "speculative." In Tornillo, the costs are found to exist (with no
more evidence than in Red Lion), and, in any event, the regulation violates
the first amendment because of its interference with editorial autonomy.
Significantly too, there is no citation of Red Lion or discussion of the
broadcast press in Tornillo. The Court deliberately ignored the conffict. 9a
Red Lion and Tornillo must be resolved, however, to determine cable's
constitutional niche with regard to fairness requirements. That broadcast-
ers must be licensed does not justify the constitutionality of fairness re-
quirements. Although licensing may be necessary to avoid destructive
interference, it does not follow that licensing can be employed to impose
unconstitutional burdens. If Tornillo is accepted, fairness interferes with
editorial autonomy and has "chilling" costs. Therefore, some other basis
must be used to establish the constitutionality of fairness requirements.
Nor can the impact theory be used. It was not employed by the Court in
Red Lion, and makes no sense: as noted, WQXR-FM has much less im-
pact than The New York Times-yet it is under a fairness doctrine, and the
Times is not.
To use the title of a song from "Fiddler on the Roof," the answer to the
puzzle appears to be tradition. The tradition in print is clear: no public
92. Id at 256-57.
93. Id at 258.
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a compulsory
access law ... the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more
than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations
on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials--whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this cru-
cial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.
Id (citations omitted).
94. See generally Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of Me-
dia Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563 (1976).
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interest licensing, and no government interference with editorial judgment
to ensure or promote fairness." That is the norm in the United States.
But in broadcasting in the 1920's, a different pattern was tried, without too
much thought as to its first amendment consequences: licensing was neces-
sary to prevent engineering chaos, and the licensing scheme was based on
the public trustee concept. That concept, in turn, embodies a fairness doc-
trine-a public trustee clearly cannot present only views with which it
agrees. When the constitutionality of the public interest scheme came
before the Supreme Court in 1943, there was again little analysis. Justice
Frankfurter simply recited that an action, if related to the public interest,
did not violate the first amendment, because radio is not inherently open
to all.96 The fairness doctrine first came before the Court in 1969-four
decades after the public trustee scheme was instituted. To invalidate the
scheme, upon which a multi-billion dollar industry had been built, would
have been most disruptive. If this analysis is correct, the explanation for
the different treatment of broadcast and print lies in the famous aphorism
of Justice Holmes: "The life of the law is not logic, but it is experience."97
Others have advanced more ingenious explanations. Professor Bollin-
ger, for example, has argued that the first amendment permits legislative
experimentation with access, but only within a segment of the mass me-
dia.98 Such a "partial system," he argues, has obvious advantages. It pro-
motes balance and diversity, but at the same time, the unregulated system
affords protection against errors or abuses arising in the regulatory enter-
prise. He noted that "above all a partial system preserves our first amend-
ment tradition of an autonomous press and makes the reform an exception
to that tradition."99 Under this explanation, Red Lion is permissible only
95. The historical basis for print media protection was noted in the Torn/lo opinion by
Justice White when he stated that "[W]e have never thought that the First Amendment
permitted public officials to dictate to the press the contents of its news columns or the slant
of its editorials." 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring). See also Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370,
where the court stated in reference to Tornillo:
The Court was writing about newspapers, a communication medium protected by
a long-standing and powerful tradition that keeping government's hands off is the
best way to achieve the 'profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open .... '
660 F.2d at 1379 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
96. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14 (1943).
97. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 1 (1881). Or, in the words of Judge Bazelon, we
have long since gone down the "slippery slope" of broadcasting and cannot start again at the
top. See Banzhaf, 405 F.2d at 1094.
98. See Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access." Toward a Theory of Partial
Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
99. Bollinger, Book Review, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1354, 1365 (1976) (reviewing B.
SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V. PUBLIC ACCESS (1976)).
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because it is the partial experiment; the Florida statute is not permitted
because there is already the one exception to the tradition.
Professor Bollinger's approach is really an after-the-fact rationalization
for the system that has been established in the last half-century. It remains
most difficult to square Tornillo's findings of "chilling" effects and the
strong policy of editorial autonomy with Red Lion's conclusions. Is the
Court really saying, "One lollapalooza a century"? In any event, under
this approach, the tradition is editorial autonomy; the exception is a fair-
ness doctrine. This is a most important consideration as to our inquiry:
cable's niche.
Finally, if experimentation is the key, it is important to evaluate its effi-
cacy. It is not the purpose of this article to treat the merits of the fairness
doctrine. That has been the subject of many books and articles."° Cer-
tainly the doctrine has its plusses: eliminating the presentation by a station
of only one view on issues such as segregation; 0 1 or preventing the affluent
from far out-purchasing their opposition on ballot issue advertisements. 10 2
But experience has also shown that it is most difficult for the government
to intervene to insure fairness, and that such difficulties extend to every
facet of the fairness doctrine. Questions have been raised as to what is a
controversial issue,10 3 what is reasonable balance as to overall time, fre-
quency, or audiences reached,"°4 what is a personal attack,'0 and so on. It
100. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 13; H. GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN
BROADCASTING (1973); see also supra note 51.
101. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
102. See, e.g., Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (Pensions), 44 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973);
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
910 (1976); Simmons, supra note 13.
104. Public Media Center, 587 F.2d 1322; Geiler, supra note 100; Simmons, supra note
13.
105. Simmons, The FCC's PersonalAttack and Political Editorial Rules Reconsidered, 125
U. PA. L. REV. 990 (1977); Brotman, Personal Attack: The Residue of Red Lion, Law Divi-
sion Ass'n for Educ. in Journalism (Competitive Paper Series, 1977). Compare Straus Com-
munications, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 385 (1975), rey'd, Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530
F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (calling congressman a coward---personal attack); Philadelphia
Fed'n of Teachers, 31 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 36 (1974) (calling public teacher association
guilty of "blackmail" and "blood money"-not a personal attack); WCME, Inc., 26
F.C.C.2d 354 (1970) (charging persons with "deliberate lie" or being "paranoid"-personal
attacks); WCMP Broadcasting Co., 41 F.C.C.2d 201 (1973) (not a personal attack to charge
public officials with "hiding County funds" "hoodwinking" another agency about them, and
using them for "taxi service"); John Birch Society, 11 F.C.C.2d 790 (1968) (stating that
group engages in "physical abuse and violence" and "local terror campaigns"--personal
attack); J. Allen Carr, 30 F.C.C.2d 894 (1971) (calling university a "breeding ground" for
"terrorists"-not a personal attack).
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thus can and does have chilling effects.oe The upshot of this difficult pro-
cess of enforcing a fairness doctrine action is that a different audience
hears a little more on the issue about eight months after the initial broad-
cast, on the average. 10 7 Such content access requirements, designed to pro-
mote a diversity of ideas or views, thus raise serious constitutional and
policy questions.0 8
In sum, Tornillo appears to represent the sound tradition, Red Lion the
aberration. " This conclusion is reinforced by the explosion of new media
and technology. That explosion means greater diversity through the oper-
ation of the marketplace, and thus even less justification for governmental
intervention to make up for failures "of the market place of ideas to oper-
ate according to the original plan . . .,110
106. See, e.g., the KREM incident, described in detail in Geller, supra note 100, at 40-43,
where it took the Commission over two years to resolve the fairness complaint in the licen-
see's favor and entailed 480 man-hours of station time and $20,000 in legal expenses; Sim-
mons, supra note 13, at 657, where, after analysis, the author concludes that the doctrine
should be called "the unfairness doctrine."
107. See Geller, supra note 100, at 37.
108. See Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and StructuralApproaches to Me-
dia Regulation, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 215 (1979); Simmons, supra note 13.
109. The aberration shows no signs of disappearing. Thus, in the last opinion dealing
with this general area, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. For Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978), the Court again stated that "[i]n light of this physical scarcity, Government alloca-
tion and regulation of broadcast frequencies are essential, as we have often recognized." Id
at 799. The Court stated further that as Buckley (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)) recog-
nized, "the broadcast media pose unique and special problems not present in the traditional
free speech case." Id at 50 n.55, (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101). Thus efforts to" 'enhanc[e] the volume and quality of cover-
age' of public issues" through regulation of broadcasting may be permissible where similar
efforts to regulate the print media would not be. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50-51 n.55 (quoting
RedLion, 395 U.S. at 393); compare Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Requiring those who wish
to obtain a broadcast license to demonstrate that such would serve the "public interest" does
not restrict the speech of those who are denied licenses; rather, it preserves the interests of
the "people as a whole. . . in free speech." Red Lion 395 U.S. at 390.
110. Emerson, supra note 79, at 795. The focus of this analysis has been on the leading
cases (Red Lion,- Tornillo) rather than on first amendment scholarship. See, e.g., T. EMER-
SON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 660-67 (1970); A. MEILKLEJOHN, POLIT-
ICAL FREEDOM (1960); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Robinson, supra note 51. Such an approach is, of course, valua-
ble, but this article's focus has been more limited in order to avoid undue length.
The underlying principle of the first amendment is to promote robust, wide-open debate,
and a marketplace of ideas from which it is hoped that truth will emerge to an informed
electorate. "[T]he widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonis-
tic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. ... Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). There remains, however, the argument whether the first amendment
speaks to diversity of sources (content neutral) or to diversity of ideas (which, as shown by
the fairness doctrine, is not content neutral). Is the amendment an affirmative sword or is it a
shield against governmental interference? This debate has long raged, and no useful pur-
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C. Common Carrier Model
While the common carrier structure of regulation has in the past been
rejected as a model for cable television, 1' it nonetheless continues to be a
relevant regulatory scheme. It is relevant both because cable is beginning
to function more like traditional common carriers, 12 and because it still
remains an alternative feasible way of regulating. 13 Common carriers, un-
like other communication media, exercise no control over the content of
what is communicated over their facilities; neither are they subject to any
content regulation.
The fundamental characteristic of regulation under the common carrier
model is that the service provider offers the communications facilities on a
first-come, first-served basis; carriage for all people indifferently is the sine
qua non of a common carrier."' Nondiscriminatory access must be avail-
able regardless of the message content,"' and, indeed, if the carrier did
seek to make individualized decisions in particular cases based upon con-
tent, it could not be classified as a common carrier. 6 This is in sharp
contrast to newspaper publishers and broadcasters who are accorded dis-
cretion to keep messages off their systems because they are deemed in
"poor taste" or express "erroneous viewpoints." Telephone companies, the
largest group of telecommunications common carriers, have no freedom to
restrict access or edit conversations based upon message content.
Because common carriers have no control over who speaks on their sys-
tem and what a speaker says, carriers are not subject to any kind of content
regulations.' '7 Not even liability for a slanderous or libelous statement at-
taches. This is consistent with the general notion that an entity that does
pose would be served by here reviewing that ground. Rather, this article deals more
pragmatically with the issues at hand.
11. See, e.g. Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Noam, Towards An Integrated Com-
munications Market. Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM.
L. 209, 218 (1982) and actions cited therein.
112. See supra note 6.
113. See generally Noam, supra note I11.
114. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). See also § 201(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976 & Supp.
1981): "It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign com-
munication by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon reasonable request
therefor .... "
115. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
116. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C.
Cit.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). See also Final Decision in Docket No. 20828 (Com-
,puter 11), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 431-32 (1980), a&'d, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
117. One commentator has suggested that common carriers can nevertheless be subject
to governmental influences regarding programming content due to the system of rate regula-
tion which usually accompanies common carriage. See Noam, supra note 111, at 220.
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not control content should be immune from liability for content."
II. THE CABLE TELEVISION MODEL
A4. Cable and Other Media
Jurisdiction over cable television originally was based upon cable being
a medium ancillary to broadcasting. 19 Agency regulations and congres-
sional actions were based on the notion that cable was a broadcast-type
source. Indeed, in cable's early stages, the view that cable was just another
type of television was justified. Video services were almost solely limited
to broadcast programming with perhaps a few primitive text services of-
fered on whatever excess channels existed. The must-carry rules (mandat-
ing carriage of most local TV signals)12 perpetuated the situation due to
the low channel capacity of most cable systems. Yet, as the uses of cable
began to change, the perception of the medium as an arm of broadcasting
television did not.121
It can be argued, on the basis of Midwest Video HI, that cable is "en-
meshed in broadcasting" and is the "functional equivalent of broadcast-
ing", that the "variant technology" does not make inapplicable the
faimess/equal time provision of section 315(a). Or, to put it differently,
since "the FCC may regulate cable TV if its regulation will further a goal
which it is entitled to pursue in the broadcast area,"' 22 it may adopt fair-
ness/equal time regulations for cable. 2 3
If this issue were presented to the courts in the context of a twelve-chan-
nel cable system, the above argument would carry considerable weight.
But the issue is much more likely to arise in the case of a new cable system
in the larger market, where a single operator may have as many as 100 TV
channels. While it still carries TV signals, 2 4 cable's main impetus in the
118. See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union, N.D. Div. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525
(1959) (broadcast licensees who have no power to censor are immune from liability) and
Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 20508, 87 F.C.C.2d 40 (1981) (differences
in editorial control over access and origination justify different levels of regulation).
119. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
120. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.51-76.54 (1981). The must-carry rules themselves are readily sup-
ported to the extent that cable is a medium enmeshed in television broadcasting. See Black
Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968). Note that a Washington State cable
system recently filed suit contesting the constitutionality of the must-carry rules. It contends,
among other things, that the rules violate the first and fifth amendments. See Cable System
Fights Over Must Carry Rules, BROADCASTING, Apr. 11, 1983, at 161.
121. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
122. Brookhaven Cable TV, 573 F.2d at 767.
123. Cf. Omega Satellite Products Co., 694 F.2d at 128.
124. Because of new decisions by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, there is apt to be less
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major markets is pay, with many new advertiser-based, satellite services. 125
Cable provides many other services such as videotext, security, and mar-
keting, some of them dependent on its two-way communications nature.
Cable also has substantial possibilities as a local distribution device com-
petitive with the telephone.126 In short, cable is a different animal than TV
broadcasting. The scarcity rationale employed to justify television regula-
tion is absurd in the case of cable. Indeed, cable not only does not use the
frequency spectrum but it is heralded as bringing an end to the television
scarcity. Nor does the impact theory justify content regulation of cable
systems. 127
Because traditional regulatory themes, such as scarcity and special im-
pact, are inapplicable to cable, broadcast concepts such as fairness should
not be mechanically applied to the new medium. Indeed, if the foregoing
analysis is correct, and Tornillo is the norm, the cable operator should be
accorded the same editorial autonomy as the newspaper. This is illus-
trated by examining just one facet of cable-videotext.
Suppose, for example, that a newspaper company transmitted a video-
text service over the telephone lines into the home. In this case, content
control clearly is improper, for the reason that content regulation of news-
papers is barred by the first amendment.128 The clearest example is news-
paper facsimile, in which an image of the newspaper is transmitted into the
home. If the Washington Post were transmitted in facsimile form, there
would be no way to distinguish the video from the printed copy and the
text would deserve the same first amendment protection. 129 Furthermore,
cable dependency on distant TV signals. See Feeling the Weight of the CRT Signal Fee
Increases, BROADCASTING, Jan. 10, 1983, at 31-32.
125. There are now 15 pay TV services, and over 40 advertiser-based cable services. See
supra note 2.
126. See supra notes 6-7.
127. See Home Box Office Inc., 567 F.2d at 45. Insofar as the impact theory relates to
cable, there are some significant differences between broadcasting and cable. The greatest
difference is the fact that cable is received only by customers paying a fee and therefore it is
not now pervasive in the same sense that broadcasting is pervasive. This further lessens the
notion of a captive audience. In terms of indecency regulation, the cable situation seems to
be closer to the case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of obscene films
in home) than that of Pacoca, 438 U.S. at 726. In terms of the actual potency of the me-
dium, cable is also to be distinguished from broadcasting. While penetration has increased
substantially, and will continue to rise--perhaps to 55-60%--this must be compared with the
98% penetration of broadcast television. There is also a significant degree of audience frag-
mentation with cable, thus diluting its impact even further. In any event, the impact theory
fails to justify content regulation even in broadcasting, let alone in cable. See supra discus-
sion in text accompanying notes 81-89.
128. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See also Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket
No. 18397, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970).
129. Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 18397, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 829
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the means of transmission is the telephone wire, a common carrier system.
Content regulation has no part in such a system.
If the same text service were transmitted via cable instead of the tele-
phone wire, the result should be the same. The text is still newspaper text
and therefore not the proper subject of content regulation. The fact that
cable is now the delivery mechanism should not matter. It would be whol-
ly illogical to subject a news story delivered to the home via cable to the
fairness doctrine or equal time requirements while permitting the same
story to enter the home through a telephone wire unburdened by any con-
tent controls. Except for the means by which they enter the home, they are
indistinguishable. The principles of editorial autonomy should still
govern.
Now suppose that the videotext transmitted over the cable is generated
by the cable operator itself rather than by a newspaper. Again, the result
should not differ. The content consists of printed words which are identi-
cal to the newspaper-generated text. It would make no sense if, for exam-
ple, a newspaper-generated story on nuclear arms was free from any
obligation to present both sides of the issue but the cable-generated story
on the same subject was so required. From the viewpoint of the video
consumer they are identical and from a first amendment viewpoint, they
are likewise identical.
From the above examples it is only a small step to video pictures trans-
mitted over cable and generated by the cable operator. Why should con-
tent which is substantially similar be subject to varying levels of content
regulation solely because it is presented wholly (or mostly) in pictures
rather than words? Again there is no rational explanation for such differ-
ing treatment save that it has been done that way for other media in the
past. This is an insufficient basis for such an illogical result. A coherent
regulatory scheme cannot produce such irrational results.
B. Franchise-De facto Monopoly Basis
Cable systems exist by virtue of the franchises awarded by local govern-
ments. Cable television requires laying coaxial cable which necessarily
disrupts the public domain, and governmental permission must be ob-
tained for the cable operator to proceed. "Thus government and cable
operators are tied in a way that government and newspapers are not. '1 30
(1970) (FCC did not intend to apply certain requirements to the distribution of printed
newspapers by way of cable.).
130. Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1378. The court held that "[slome form of permission from the
government must, by necessity, precede such disruptive use of the public domain." Id at
1377-78.
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There is "a sheer limit" physically on the number of cables that can use the
existing poles or underground conduits or the streets.13' Thus, although
cable operators are not the "public trustees" as are broadcasters under the
Communications Act, neither are they the telepublishers they assert.132
It is also important to consider the fact that cable systems are defacto
monopolies. There will generally be only one cable system in any city, or
in large cities like New York, in any one area of the city. Cities do not
often grant a cable franchise to more than one operator even if the grant is
deemed "non-exclusive." Further, even if municipalities allowed multiple
systems, economics currently dictate that only one system is feasible due to
high construction costs.' 33 Because the public trustee scheme for broad-
casting is based on the combination of government licensing and scarcity,
it could be argued that a similar system with all it entails could be justified
for cable in light of this monopolistic situation.' 34
The new cable does present the compelling or substantial justification
for governmental intervention required under United States v. O'Brien. ,
35
The government has a legitimate interest in intervening either to deal with
monopoly 36 or the unhealthy first amendment situation which exists
where one entity can control the content of 80-100 TV channels into the
home in the large cities.' 37 Yet, it does not follow that regulation as a
public trustee (with all it embodies such as fairness, equal time, etc.) is
permissible. It is well settled that such regulation, when accomplishing its
131. Id at 1378.
132. Report to Sen. Packwood, supra note 50, at 45-46.
133. But see Owen & Greenhalgh, Competitive Policy Consideration in Cable Television
Franchising, Oct. 1982, Washington, D.C.
134. See Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1378. The cable industry argues strongly that there is no
monopoly, even if there is no competing system, in light of alternatve means of delivering
the programming material (over-the-air TV, multipoint, cassettes, discs, direct broadcast sat-
ellite, etc.). See Report to Sen. Packwood, supra note 50, at 26-29. But in so far as the TV
viewer is concerned, he or she is locked to the cable system. Thus, if cable obtains 55%-60%
penetration (the usual estimated figure), it means that the only way to reach this substantial
number of TV viewers is via cable. Under this analysis, "churn" (subscribers dropping
cable) is not of great significance, so long as cable maintains a substantial penetration figure
(e.g., 30% or more).
135. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
136. Omega Satellite Products Co., 694 F.2d at 125-26.
[C]able television involves another type of interference-interference with other
users of telephone poles and underground ducts. Moreover, the apparent natural
monopoly characteristics of cable television provide. . . an argument for regula-
tion of entry (though it should be noted that while today most newspaper markets
are natural monopolies, no one thinks that entry into those markets could be regu-
lated without creating that profound first amendment problems). Id at 127-28.
137. See Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 48 (applying incidental restriction test in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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independent purpose, should do so by the narrowest possible means, with
the least impact on first amendment freedoms.' Thus, adopting public
trustee regulation for cable would repeat the same mistake that was made
without forethought in 1927 as to broadcasting.
Cable regulation should be structural rather than behavioral. The gov-
ernment should require that some significant number of cable channels be
available on a leased channel basis--the common carrier model.' 3 9 Gov-
ernment intervention would then not be keyed to the content of any cable
programming. Because this alternative is much less likely to unduly inter-
fere with editorial decisions," ° the leased channel approach, rather than
the public trustee approach, must be used to deal with the legitimate and
substantial problem here involved. This alternative would accomplish the
governmental purpose of diversifying the sources of information in a con-
tent neutral manner. -..-
Opponents of this approach argue that a newspaper could not be consti-
tutionally required to turn over some number of its pages to common car-
rier access, even in monopoly situations. They point out that newspapers
make use of the city's streets for delivery, but that such use does not justify
subjecting them to content or common carrier-type regulation. But unlike
newspapers which simply use the streets in the way many businesses do,
cable requires a governmentfranchise to run its wires over or under the
streets and government assistance to gain access to buildings.'' The
proper analogy is thus to telephone companies, which also must obtain a
franchise for their wire systems. It cannot be seriously disputed that the
local government can grant authority to the telephone operator on condi-
tion that the business be conducted on a common carrier basis (regardless
of whether there was a monopoly or two phone companies were author-
ized). Why then cannot the government similarily condition a cable au-
thorization to require that the cable operator, at least to a substantial
extent, make available channel capacity on a common carrier basis? The
138. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In this specific context of cable and the first amendment, see
Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1379 ("the power to regulate is not one whit broader than the need that
evokes it").
139. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
140. This approach may entail other governmental problems of an economic nature-
such as regulation of the rates charged for the leased channels, or the use of compulsory
arbitration processes in the event of a deadlocked dispute. But that possibility does not raise
difficult first amendment issues.
141. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
[Vol. 32:603
Cable, Content Regulation
cable operator can exercise its first amendment rights on fifty, sixty, or
seventy TV channels, and although it cannot control the content of another
twenty to thirty channels, it will still earn a fair return.
Congress also can require cable operators to provide a significant
amount of leased access capacity because of cable's interstate nature (due
to extensive satellite services).' 42 Congress can base any such conditions
on the great concentration of control resulting from the government-
granted cable franchise and its undesirable effects on underlying first
amendment principles. Leased access requirements would implement the
Associated Press principle underlying the first amendment by diversifying
the sources of information. 143
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,'44 the Court
upheld a prospective ban on newspaper-broadcasting combinations lo-
cated in the same community as a reasonable means of furthering the
highly valued goal of diversified information sources. The governmental
interest was the same as that articulated in Associated Press. "4' And, like
the leased access proposal, the regulations were "not content related" and
"their purpose and effect [was] to promote free speech, not to restrict it."'"
Consequently, the leased channel, common carrier alternative proposed in
this article should pass constitutional muster under this precedent and the
O'Brien"147 and Home Box Office, Inc. test.' 48
142. An earlier version of the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1982, S. 2172, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), did specify 10% leased channel capacity, but, under pressure from the
cable industry, this requirement was dropped in the later bill, which died with the expiration
of the 97th Congress. This version in the 98th Congress (S.66) contains a provision explicitly
proscribing common carrier regulation of cable except where it is engaged in basic telephone
service.
143. In Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20, the Court stated that the first amendment "rests
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of
a free society."
144. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
145. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
146. 436 U.S. at 801.
147. We recognize that the O'Brien standard evolved out of the case of "symbolic
speech" conduct and this, is arguably inapplicable to the pure speech situation here consid-
ered, despite its use by the Home Box Office court. In any event, however, the fact that cable
uses the city streets and is awarded a municipal franchise supports the content-neutral regu-
lation suggested.
148. Courts and commentators alike have recognized that if cable television were a pub-
lic forum, there would be a government-guaranteed right of access. See, e.g., Midwest Video
11, 571 F.2d at 1054; Emerson, supra note 79, at 807-11. While the government involvement
in cable operations arguably makes it a public forum, however, it is not likely that the pres-
ent Supreme Court would apply the doctrine. The Court has been relatively consistent in its
recent refusals to expand the public forum doctrine, and in fact has contracted it signifi-
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C Summary of the Cable Model-Functional Analysis
The foregoing discussion leads to several conclusions about cable and its
regulation. First, cable is a unique medium and therefore, cannot be
neatly shoeboxed into the regulatory models for broadcasting or print.
While there are similarities, there are great differences in the actual and
potential uses of cable. Second, regulation which is imposed solely be-
cause of the transmission medium produces illogical results. Thus, con-
trolling the content of a text service simply because it is transmitted via
coaxial cable rather than telephone lines makes little sense. Finally, and
most important, the first amendment generally calls for editorial autonomy
rather than government-mandated fairness. While regulation may im-
pinge on speech to serve an important governmental purpose, such regula-
tion should be narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. Specifically, the
amendment favors structural regulations which promote a "multitude of
tongues"' 49 as opposed to behavioral regulations. which directly intrude
upon program content. Any regulatory scheme for cable should take into
account these general conclusions while acknowledging the special attrib-
utes of the medium.
The proposed regulatory structure follows the different functions of
cable. These functions fall into three groups: (1) retransmission functions,
(2) origination functions, and (3) conduit functions. The retransmission
function entails carriage of broadcast signals. The origination function
consists of all programming activities in which the cable operator fulfills
an editorial function. The conduit function describes those activities where
the cable system is simply a means of transmission, similar to the tele-
phone or an MDS system. This latter function is the key to the first
amendment problems involving cable.
L Retransmission Function
All retransmission functions (broadcast-based) should be subject to reg-
ulation under the broadcast regulatory model. When a cable operator per-
cantly, limiting it only to traditional public fora such as streets and public parks. See, e.g.,
Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (public television
station not a public forum); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S.
114 (1981) (mailbox not a public forum); and Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jail
not a public forum). Further, not even all government-owned facilities are deemed public
fora. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 9.
149. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Justice Hand's
opinion in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (The
first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.").
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forms such retransmission functions, it is truly "enmeshed in ...
broadcasting" 5' and indeed, simply is "forwarding" the broadcast signal
within the definition of section 2(a) of the Communications Act.' 5 ' Regu-
lation of the retransmission functions of cable along the lines of the broad-
cast structure is therefore "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's responsibilities for the regulation of tele-
vision broadcasting."' 52 Clearly, cable stands in a unique position with
regard to broadcasting when it retransmits broadcast signals." 3 It could
not properly retransmit the use of a station's facilities by one candidate
and then drop the signal when rival candidates were afforded equal oppor-
tunities.'54 In short, broadcasting regulation should apply with equal
weight when those same channels are transmitted via cable. This retrans-
mission aspect of cable television gives it "the same constitutional status
under the First Amendment as regulation of the transmission of signals by
the originating television stations . . . .,
2. Origination Functions
All origination channels should be free from the content regulations to
which they are currently subject. Origination cablecasting is defined as
programming subject to the exclusive control of the cablecaster. 5 6 Cur-
rently, a cable operator engages in origination functions on all channels
other than must-carry channels (and public access/governmental channels
which usually are required and excluded from operator control by the
franchise agreement). Cable should, however, be subject to a substantial
leased access requirement which would ensure that the first amendment
diversity of sources principle is satisfied.
As illustrated above, 5 7 cable functions and newspaper functions often
are similar-the operators select content and edit it to suit their needs.' 58
The content can be text or pictures; there is little that distinguishes them.
Editorial autonomy should be just as strong a guiding principle in the
150. Midwest Video 11, 440 U.S. at 700.
151. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).
152. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 178.
153. Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968).
154. While the 1976 Copyright Act may have practical consequences, this article is con-
cerned with content regulation required by the Communications Act (e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a) (1976), with its equal opportunities and fairness requirements).
155. Black Hills Video, 399 F.2d at 69,
156. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (1976).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
158. See Home Box Office, Inc., 567 F.2d at 46.
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cable context as it is in the newspaper context. Indeed, it is central to the
concept of a truly free press.
Freeing cable from content regulation in its origination functions fur-
thers the Associated Press principle provided a right of leased access is
granted. The leased access grant reconciles to some extent the unavoidable
tension between access and editorial autonomy for the press in the special
circumstances of cable. Cable systems would enjoy unfettered discretion
as part of the nation's electronic press. At the same time, the public's right
to speak freely would not be "snuffed out."' 5 9 Cable's large channel ca-
pacity makes such an accommodation possible.
3. Conduit Functions
Where cable functions solely as a conduit-whether as a local distribu-
tion line for SBS or MCI or a data transmission mechanism between
banks' 60-- the cable operator has no legitimate interest in selecting or al-
tering the content of transmissions. Consequently, under the model pro-
posed in this article, cable systems, like common carriers, would be
prohibited from controlling the message content of a given transmission.
Since the operator has no first amendment interest in editing such content
anyway, this regulation cannot be considered an infringement of its first
amendment rights.
In addition to this requirement of nondiscrimination, the leased access
requirement described above should be adopted. Under this requirement,
a cable system would serve all comers indifferently and with a complete
separation of content and conduit.'
6
'
III. CONCLUSION
Cable represents a growing medium of great importance to the United
States society and economy. The 1974 Cabinet Committee Report 62
strongly urged that the United States policy in cable should not repeat the
mistakes made with broadcasting, subjecting it to intrusive governmental
intervention. The report concluded that a sounder policy is to require a
separation of content and conduit (the common carrier model), with video
publishing over the multiple channels (the print model). This policy was
159. The Court stated in RedLion that "[t]he right of free speech. . .does not embrace
a right to snuff out the free speech of others." 395 U.S. at 387 (citation omitted).
160. Dialing Locally-WithoutAT& T, BusrNEss WEEK, Oct. 5, 1981, at 34.
161. See Leased Access Petition of Henry Geller and Ira Barron, FCC RM-3294, for one
possible method of implementing an overall access requirement.
162. Cabinet Report on Cable Communications, Report to the President (1974).
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to be implemented when cable obtained 50% penetration, and with the
cable operator maintaining control over two channels.
The 1974 report was never implemented or indeed even the subject of a
congressional hearing. Cable will approach 50% penetration in about five
years-and with complete control over 80, 100, or 119 channels. The issue
now is whether government will act to promote essential first amendment
goals with respect to a substantial number of cable channels. The FCC
appears indifferent, and Congress seems to be marching to the cable indus-
try's tune. Behaviorial regulation of a broadcast nature now applies to
cable, and so far at least, the nation seems to be headed down the same
"slippery slope" with cable that it did with broadcasting.
It is time-indeed long past time-that we focus on the issues raised by
the 1974 report. The proper functioning of democracy depends on sound
application of first amendment principles to our important media. In
cable, that approach is sorely lacking today.

